Decentralized Management and Optimization of Development in Large Production Organizations by Kulikowski, R.
Decentralized Management and 
Optimization of Development in 
Large Production Organizations
Kulikowski, R.
IIASA Working Paper
 
1974
Kulikowski, R. (1974) Decentralized Management and Optimization of Development in Large Production Organizations. 
IIASA Working Paper. Copyright © 1974 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/113/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
DECEN'l'RALIZED MANAGEMENT AND OPTUUZATION
OF DEVELOPMENT IN LARGE PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS
R. Kulikowski
October 1974 WP-74-58
WOLking Papers are not intended for
distribution outside of IIASA, and
are solely for discussion and infor-
mation purposes. The views expressed
are those of the author, and do not
necessarily reflect those of IIASA.

1 ... n.
1. Introduction
The paper deals with the model of large production organizations
which consists of n sectors S., ｾ = 1 ..• n, (Fig. 1.a). Each sector
ｾ
produces X.. goods per year and purchases X..• j = 1 ... n, goods from
ｾ ｾ ｊ ｾ
sectors S.. It employs X . labor per year and receives Z. funds for
J I ｯｾ ｾ
capital ｩ ｮ ｶ ･ ｳ ｴ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ from the central management S*. There is a
decentralized management system being used. Each sector maximizes the
net profit by choosing the best X.. , j = 1 n, ｭ ｾ ｸ and using the
ｊ ｾ
development resources (i.e. the investment and labor) allotted by central
management S*. The objective of S* is to maximize the long range profit
(development) by the best allocation of global available resources
(capital and labor). However, S* does not pay attention to the inter-
sector flow of goods, X.. , i, j
ｾｊ
The organization structure of each sector S. (see Fig. 1.b) is
ｾ
similar to S. It consists of Sik subsectors, k = 1 ... ni , which
exchange the final subsector goods ｘ ｩ ｫ ｾ Ｇ k, ｾ = J
the net subsectors profits.
n. and maximize
ｾ
The subsector management centers ｓ ｾ Ｌ ｾ = 1 ... n, allocate in an
ｾ
optimum manner the resources (allotted by S*) among the Sik' k = 1 n i ,
subsectors. The sum of goods leaving sector Sik' k = 1 • .. n. and
ｾ
directed to S. is labeled X.. , j = 1 ... n. In the same manner the sum
J ｾｊ
of goods received by Xik , k = 1 ••• ni , from Sj is labeled Xji , j = 1 ... n.
Each subs ector S'k' k = 1 ... n., can be represented in the expanded
ｾ ｾ
form of subsectors of lower order etc.
Dealing with such a complex, hierarchically organized structure, it ｾ ｳ
convenient to decompose it ｾ ｮ such a form that the intersector flows
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Xij , Xitk' do not interfere with the S*, st allocation strategies.
That constitutes the first task undertaken in the paper. Then the
problem of best allocation of development resources is investigated.
The third part of the paper consists of investigation of prices on
the long-range development strategy.
As a concrete example the Cobb-Douglas production functions have
been used to describe the sector input-output relations.
Using the present model it is possible to avoid the gap which exists
between the micro-production and macro-economic models.
2. Decomposition
Consider the system shown in Fig. l.a, which will be called the
normative n-sector production model. Let the input-output production
functions of S., i = 1 ..• n, be given in the form:
ｾ
q. n ex ••
X.. ｆ Ｎ ｾ IT X. ｾＱ , ｾ = 1 ... n
ｾｾ ｾ j=O ｊ ｾ
jfi
(1)
where F., ex •• - given positive numbers, 0 < ex •• < 1,
ｾ J ｾ J ｾ
q.
ｾ
= 1 -
n
L
j=O
j Ii
ex •• > 0,
ｊ ｾ
ｾ = 1 ... n, j 0, 1 ... n
x . = employment at S.
ｯ ｾ ｾ
Assume the prices p. of goods X.. be given, i = 1 ... n, so that
ｾ ｾ ｾ
Y.. =p.x .. ,Y ..
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ J ｾ p.X .. , i, j =1J J ｾ n, p = averaoe wage, so that:o 0
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Y ••
11
n
K. IT
1 j=O
j1i
ll· .)1
Y••
1)
(2)
where
K.
1
I q.
1p.F.
1 1
n
IT
j=O
j1i
-ll ..)1p.
)
Assume also that the local objective functions are the net protits:
n
P. = Y•• }: Y •• , 1 1 ... n (3)1 11 j=O )1
j1i
The sector S. strategy consists in maximization of (3), where Y..1 11
is expressed by (2), subject to the limitation of input cost i.e.:
n
}:
j=O
j1 i
Y .• < ｙｾ
)1 - 1
1 1 ... n ) = 0, 1 ... n
and Y .. > 0
)1 -
where ｙ ｾ is assumed to be g1ven.
1
(5)
Since P.(Y .... Y .) is a strictly concave function in the compact1 01 n1
set n defined by (4) and (5) the unique values Y..)1
exist; such that
A *Y.. (Y. ), j = 0, 1 ••• n,
) 1 1
max P. (Y .
Y ,.., 1 01•• E a
1)
Y .) = P. (Y .
n1 1 01 y .)n1
These values can be easily derived by standard Lagrange multiplier
technique yielding:
where
A
Y.•
J1
a. ..
J1
= --
a..
1
*Y. ,1
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j = 0, 1 ... n, 1 = 1 ... n (6)
./One also obta1ns
a.. =
1
n
L
j=O
jli
a. ..
J1
where
A
Y•.
11
= Y• • (Y .. )11 J1
a..
= ｍＮｙｾ 1
1 1
i 1 ... n (7)
-a.. n a. .. q.
n C· fiM. K.a.. 1 II J1 F. 1 II ｾ= a. ..1 1 1 j=O J1 1 . 0 p.a..J= J 1
jli jli
(a. .. = -1), i
11
1 ... n
Now it is possible to choose the optimum input cost level ｙ ｾ Ｌ 1n
1
such a way that the profits
a..
P. = ｍＮｙｾ 1111 *Y.,1=1 ••• n1 (8)
attain the ｾ ｡ ｸ Ｑ ｭ ｵ ｭ value. Since (8) is strictly concave function a unique
*optimum value Y. = Y., i = 1 ... n, exists, such that1 1
max P. Ｈ ｙ ｾ Ｉ
1 1
That value becomes
P. (Y.)
1 1
ｙｾ
1
Y.
1
l/q.
1(a..M.) ,i
1 1
1 ... n (9)
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Then setting Y., into (7), (6), (8) one gets:
1
l/q. a. /
n e'Jji/q , l/q." a. 1 q.1 1 1 II --.J...!:. 1 1Y.. M.Y. M. a. F. p.11 1 1 1 1 1 j=O Pj 1
jfi
l/q. a. /a .. 1 q.
" J1 - 1 1 "Y.. = - Y. = a .. M. a. a .. Y..J1 a. 1 J1 1 1 J1 111
l/q. a. /
"
1 q.
"P. (Y.) 1 1P. = M. a. (1 - a.) = q.Y ..1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
(10)
(11)
(12)
i = 1 n, J = 0, 1 '" n
One should observe that the global net profit becomes:
n n
"
n n(n, J'ij / q , l/q.P = L P. = L Y. = L q.F. II --.J...!:. 1 p. 1
i=l 1 i=l 1 i=l 1 1 j=O Pj 1
jli
where'
n n
" " " " "Y. Y.. - L Y.. Y.. - L a ..Y..1 11 j=l 1J 11 j=l 1J JJ
jfi jfi
(13)
is the net output of S. under optimum decision strategies.
1
The main result (see also Ref. [3]) can be formulated 1n the form
of a theorem:
Theorem 1
The optimum input output share Y.. /Y .. , i = 1 ... n, j = 0, 1 ... n,J1 11
1n the normative n sector Cobb-Douglas production model is equal to the
- 6 -
-/
the production function elasticties: dY .. /Y ..
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
j = 0, 1 ... n, i = 1 ... n.
dY . . /Y .. = a .. ,
_ ｾｊ ｾｊ J ｾ
In other words, Theorem 1 states that the normative n-sector
Cobb-Douglas production system behaves under optimum strategies in the
same way as the Leontief model with the ｴ ･ ｣ ｨ ｮ ｯ ｬ ｯ ｧ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｬ coefficients
Y.. IY.. = a .. , j = 0, 1 .•. n, i = 1 ••• n, j :f i.J ｾ ｾｾ J ｾ
Remark 1
In the case when the labor supply L . is less than the optimum
OJ..
-1 " .demand X . = p a .Y .. , ｾ = 1 ..• n, one should consider X . = L . as
ｯ ｾ 0 ｯｾ ｾｾ ｯｾ ｯｾ
constant in (1) and maximize (3) subject to (4) (5) with j = 1 n.
That is equivalent to problem with production functions:
q. n a ..
X.. - ｾ II X.. ｊ ｾ= F.
ｾ ｾ ｾ j=l ｊ ｾ
j:fi
where
F.L .
ｾ ｯｾ
Remark 2
F.
ｾ
a '1ｯｾ q.
ｾ
ｾ = 1 ... n
The relations (10) 7 (13) can be easily extended to the case of
sectors described by C.E.S. production functions
a.q. n
-v ｾY•• = ｆＮｾ r JJ •• Y•. Vｾｾ ｾ j=O ｊｾ ｊｾ
(14)
where V E [-1, OJ,
n
r JJ ••
, 1
1, JJ •• > 0, j = 0, 1 ... n, i = 1 ... n.
, 1
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Since the solution of problems (3), (4) and (5) with production
function (14) yields:
t'} ..
Y.. = ｾ ｙｾ
J1 - 1t'}.
1
where
J = 0, 1 ... n, i 1 ... n,
1
t'} ｾｾ + v) nt'} .. = t'}. Lt'} ••
J1 Jl. 1 j=O J 1
and
a.
"-
- * 1Y.. = M.Y.
11 1 1
where
q. (1 + v) a.
M. F. 1 t'}. \I 1=
1 1 1
one gets:
l/q. a. / F. [;,.(1 + V) ]"i/Qi"- 1 q. \I- 1 1Y.. M. a. = a.11 1 1 1 1 1
"- t'}ji - t'} .. l/q. t'} . .a.］ Ｍ ｾ (a.M.) 1 J 1 1 "-Y.. = --=--- Y. = Y..
J1 t'} . 1 1 1 11
". tJ •l. 1 1
1
-
a. q.
"-"- 1) 1P. = (M.a. (1 - a.) = q. Y..
1 1 1 1 1 11
1 = 1 ... n, J 0,'1 ... n
(15)
(16)
(17)
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Remark 3
It is possible to extend the results (10) 7 (13) to the case when
Y.. , a .. , i = 1 •.. n, j = 0, 1 .•. n are changing continuously in time.
ｾ ｊ ｾ ｊ I
In that case ｲ ｾ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ (10) 7 (13) remain valid.
It should also be observed that the sector output (10) has been
entirely decomposed, so it depends only on s. production function
ｾ
parameters and prices. When prices are fixed the changes in S., J :f iJ
parameters will have no effect on the S. production. The supply of goods
ｾ
on the market, i.e. Y., may change, however, when S. change. In order
ｾ J
"to change Y.. or profit (12) one has to change the technology (i.e. a ..
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｊ
coefficients) or F.--what can be done by reallocation of investments--
ｾ
or labor (in the case when it ｾ ｳ in short supply as shown in Remark 1).
Assuming that a .. and p., i, J = 1 ••• n, are given one can consider
J1 J
the output production (10) (where F. depends on the investment Z.) as a
ｾ ｾ
nonlinear, dynamic operator A. of the investment strategy, i.e.
ｾ
"Y.. = A.(Z.), i
ｾｾ ｾ ｾ
1 ••• n (18)
The central management center allocates the given amount of investment
resources Z among the sectors S., i = 1 ... n, in such a manner that the
ｾ
maximum production
Y =
n
1:
i=l
A. (Z.)
ｾ ｾ
or the optimum system development follows. The sector management centers
ｓ ｾ Ｌ i = 1 ... n, allocate the resources Z., ｾ = 1 .•. n, received from S*ｾ ｾ ,
among the lower level subsystems Sik' k = 1 n.. As a result a
ｾ
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multilevel structure of decision centers follows (Fig. 2). The production
plants are grouped generally at the bottom of that structure.
Besides the investments Z. the employment (X .) and other resources,
ｾ ｯ ｾ
which are ｾ ｮ short supply, can be allocated using the decomposition
technique described by (10) ｾ (13) or (15) ｾ (17). One should observe
that the the present model is interesting first of all for the centrally
planned economies, where the hierarchical system of development planning
is commonly used.
3. Optimization of Development
Instead of dealing with the aggregated (within 1 year) variables
A
Y.. , Z., X ., i = 1 ... n, we shall introduce the resources intensity,
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｯ ｾ
ｾ Ｎ ･ Ｎ the rates of resources flow in unit time. We shall denote these new
variables by y.(t), z.(t) x.(t) respectively. Then the relation which
ｾ ｾ ｾ
relates x.(t), z.(t) to y.(t) can be written in the form of an operator:
ｾ ｾ ｾ
A. : X x Z ｾ Y, or explicitly:
ｾ
y. (t) = A. (x. (. ), z. ( • ) ) , ｾ = 1 ••• n
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
where X, Z, Y are, generally speaking, the ｧ ｾ ｶ ･ ｮ Banach spaces.
(19)
It .should be noted that the relation between the investment intensity
z(t) and the productive capital (or the so called plant capacity) c(t)
usually is written in the form of a differential equation:
dc
dt = Kz ( t) - <5 c( t)
where 0 depreciation of capital, K positive constant, c(O) c = ｧｾｶ･ｮＬ
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Integrating that equation one gets:
c(t) = A(z(o)) -at - Jt aTe [c + 0 Ke z <T) dT] (20)
In our approach it is proposed to describe the A. operators by the1.
more general than (20) expression:
y. = [c. (z.)] S M(x.), 1.1. 1. 1. 1.
where
1 ... n (21)
c. (t)1.
M(x.)1.
a, S
1 - S[x. (t)]1.
g1.ven numbers, 0 < a < 1, 0 < 8 < 1,
(22)
(23)
k.(t, T) = g1.ven continuous function, k.(t, T) = 0, for t < T.1. 1.
In the case where k.(t, T) = e-a(t - T) for t - T > 0 and a = 1, (22)
1.
is equivalent to (20). There exist however cases when using (22) one
can describe better the real investment processes. First of all it is
possible to take into account the plant construction delay, T .. Besides,01.
the capacity increases usually in a gradual manner rather as shown in
Fig. 3 for the case of z.(t) = 1, t > O. The a, 8 coefficients take into1.
account the nonlinear effects of the investment processes. It is assumed
that within the range of planned plant capacities no increased return to
scale can be achieved (a, 8 < 1).
The operator (23) represents the employment or generally the aggregated
operation, repairs and maintenance (ORM) costs. The expected production
('
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output:
y =
n
r
i=l
Y.(x., z.)
1 1 1
(24)
where wI (t) = given discount function,
T = given planning horizon,
depends on the strategies x., y., 1 = 1 ... n which are bounded by the
1 1
given cumulative investment Z and ORM cost X:
< X
< Z
(25)
(26)
where w2 (t), w3 (t) - given discount functions.
As a discount function one can take
w. (t)
1
-t
= (l + e:) , i = 1, 2, 3
or w.(t) = (1 + e:)T - t
1 i = 2, 3
where e: = given discount rate. The last form is used when the investment
is financed by a bank and it 1S necessary to pay the interests back at
the end of the T interval.
Now it is possible to formulate the development optimization problem:
Find the non-negative strategies x.(t) = x.(t), z.(t) = z.(t), i = 1 ... n,
111 1
t E [0, T], such that
max
z.En
1
Y(x, z) = ｙＨｾＬ z)
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where n is the set of all non-negative functions which satisfy (25) and
(26) •
As shown in Ref [2] for n 1. there exists a unique solution to the
present problem and*
ｾ Ｈ ｴ Ｉ - get) zｦｾ w3 (t)g(t)dt
ｾ (t) = h(t) Xｦｾ w2(t)h(t)dt
where
1
[W1 (t)rh(t) w
2
(t) C ｌｾ｝
1
T)dtJ 1
1
[ -1 fT B -1 - aget) = w3 (1') T wl (t) w2 (t) k(t,
One gets also
Y(x, z) = FB(l - a)ZaBX(l - B)
where
(27)
(28)
(29)
1, a = !, k(t, T) = exp[-8(t - T)].
One gets
-6 (t - T)] 2
- e
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1
h(t) = e-ot ｦ ｾ eOT[l - e-O(T - ｔＩ｝ｩＨｾＩＲ dT
The plots of x(t), z(t), for oT = 4, have been shown in Fig. 4. The
optimum investment strategy z(t) decreases monotonously for t + T while
the ORM cost intensity 1ncreases for t + T to the maximum value (the
explanation is that it does not pay to spend resources on ORM cost when
the plant contruction is not finished yet).
It should also be observed that the expected income under optimum
strategies (29) is an increasing function of the planning interval T: i.e.:
where F(T) increases along with T.
In" our example for instance
F(t) = 0-2 fT
o
{l - exp[-O(T - T)]}2dT 1 for large oT.
- {}
Then yet) for large oT increases as fast as (OT)y/2. There exist then
such point T = T that yeT ) = X + Z.
m m
At that time instant a return of
input cost X + Z can be achieved.
It should be also observed that the ratio
X + Z
neT) = yeT)
1S a convenient measure of investment effectiveness and is being used 1n
- 14 -
the standard practice of investment planning. Namely one chooses from
the set 0 possible investment projects, characterized by different
n.(T), those which have the smallest values of n ..
1 1
Consider now the solution of the general optimization problem
(24) + (26). One can use a decomposition approach starting with the local
solutions of n sub-problem:
max IT wl(t)y.(t)dt
o 1
x
1
·, y. E ｾＧｌ
1 1
where
x. IT w2 (t)x. (t)dt < X., x. (t) ｾ 0, t E [0, T]1 o. 1 - 1 1 .
n. =
1
IT w3(t)z.(t)dt < z.,z. z. (t) > a t E [0, T]1 o 1 - .1 1
X. , z. = given numbers.
1 1
(30)
Using formulae (27) and (28) one can write down the explicit form
of these solutions and by (29) one gets
where
Y. (x., Z.)
111
F.S(l - ｡Ｉｚｾｓｘｾｬ - S)
111
1 = 1 n (31)
The solution of the coordinating (or global) problem can be formulated
as follows. Find the strategies X., Z. E n such that
1 1
y (32)
r- 15 -
attains maximum in the set:
n
X. E X. < X, X. > 0, J. = 1 ... nJ. i=l J.- J.-
r2=
n
Z. E Z. < Z, Z. > 0, J. = 1 ... nJ. i=l J. J.
Since Y is a strictly concave continuous function in the compact
set r2, it attains, according to the Weierstrass theorem, the upper bound
which is on the border of n. Then using the standard Lagrange multiplier
technique one can derive the optimum solution which becomes
F.
A J.X. = F X, J. = 1 ... nJ.
A
F.J.Z. = Z, i 1 ... nJ. F
(33)
(34)
Then one can derive
When the values X., Z., i = 1 •.• n, are known it is possible to solveJ. J.
all the local subproblems explicitly.
The result obtained can be formulated J.n the form of a theorem.
Theorem 2
The unique optimum strategy for the problem (24) .. (26) exists:
ｾ Ｎ (t) g. (t) Y 1F' J. = ... nJ. J.
x. (t) h. (t) X 1¢, J. = ... nJ. J.
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where
1
1
')dJI - ag. (t) [ -I IT w1 (t)S -1= w3 (T) w2 (t) ki(t,1 T
1
h. (t) =rl (t) ｃ Ｎ ｛ ｚ Ｎ ｬ ｽ ｾ1 W2 (t) 1 1
such that
n '
L JT w2(t)h.(t)dt; Fi=l 0 1
n
L IT w3(t)g.(t)dt;i=l 0 1
A
Y = max Y(x, y)
X.y.En
1 1
(35)
Since the resulting output (i.e. the resulting production function)
(35) is of the identical analytic form as the subsystems production
functions (31) Theorem 2 can be regarded as an aggregation principle.
According to that principle one can aggregate the production functions
1n the decomposed hierarchic system shown in Fig. 2, starting with the
lowest level, and getting the function of the type (35) at each decision
level. The global production function of the entire system of Fig. 2
assumes the well-known macro-economic Cobb-Douglas function. In that way
it is possible to obtain the macro-economic production function as a
result of aggregation performed on the micro-production functions.
Two more remarks should be formulated:
Remark 1
Since the statistical information, regarding the input-output
- 17 -
. I
relations, is usually g1ven 1n the quantitative form one can replace the
time functions: x.(t), z.(t), y.(t), i = 1111 n, t f [0, TJ by vectors
with components x .. , z .. , y .. , j = 0, 1 T. Consequently, the integrals1J 1J 1J
in (24) 7 (26) should be replaced by sums etc.
Remark 2
If it 1S necessary to consider separately the existing and the
planned production resources (i.e. labor and capital) one can write
instead of (21)
+y. = y. + y.111
where
ｺ ｾ Ｈ ｴ Ｉ Ｌ x.(t) = investment and labor 1n already existing economy,
1 1
+ +
z.(t), x.(t) = investment and labor in the planned economy.
1 1
These and other details of the model have been studied extensively
1n Ref [4J.
3. The Influence of Prices
In the model studied in Section 2, the prices were treated as g1ven
egzogeneous factors. This will not be true if the model final production*
*The influence of the egzogeneous labor will be neglected in the
present section, so j = 1 ... n.
- 18 -
n
" "Y. Y•• L Y.• , ｾ = 1 ... n (36)
ｾ Ｎ ｾ ｾ j=l ｾ ｊ
jfi
ｾ ｳ sold on the monopolistic market.
In order to investigate the last case let us find first of all
the numerical values of prices which will ensure the given values of
final products, say Y. = Q., i = 1 •.. n.
ｾ ｾ
Taking into account that
Y •• = CL • •Y •• ,
ｾｊ ｾｊ JJ
ｾ = 1 ... n, J = 1 ... n
the equations (36) can be written ｾ ｮ the following matrix form
Since A is a matrix composed of technological coefficients
- .
(the Leontief model) it is reasonable to assume that the ｾ ｮ ｶ ･ ｲ ｳ ･
(37)
[ -1ｾ = ｾ - A] exists and B > O.
a unique solution !(Q) > O.
Then for a given vector Q there exists
Then there exist positive numbers:
"Y •• (Q)
ｾ ｾ -L. (Q)
ｾ Ｍ n
F. 11
ｾ j=l
jfi
CL • • /ｊｾ q.
ｾ
o. ••
ｊ ｾ
q.
ｾ
ｾ = 1 ... n
and by (2) one gets the following set of equations
n
p. 11
ｾ j=l
jfi
-a ..
(p.) J ｾ
J
L. (Q) ,
ｾ -
i 1 ... n
- 19 -
or (by ｾ ｡ ｫ ｩ ｮ ｧ logarithms from both sides):
1n p. -
ｾ
n
E
j=l
jli
a .. 1n p.
ｊ ｾ J
1n L. (Q),
ｾ Ｍ
ｾ = 1 ... n (38)
The result obtained can be formulated ｾ ｮ the form of a theorem.
Theorem 3
In the normative decentralized production system, described by
equations. (1) -;- (12) with the determinant
1, -0.21 , ... , -an1
D =
-a12 , 1, ••• , -an2
-a1n .....••.•.•. 1
I 0
there exists, for each positive vector Q, a ｵｮｾｱｵ･ set of positive prices
which ·can be derived by (38).
Now the problem can be approached from the point of ｶ ｾ ･ ｷ of welfare
economics. On the supply side we have the production system which tries
to maximize the output!. On the demand side we have consumers with the
given utility function:
where X. - the goods consumed (in natural units).
ｾ
As an example one can consider the following utility function:
U = a
n
II
i=l
y.
ｾ
X.
ｾ
n
E
i=l
y.
ｾ
1
'v nAC; t-; l.TD 1il1TnhATC
Introducing ｰ ｲ ｾ ｣ ･ ｳ p., i
ｾ
- 20 -
1 ... n, one can write
n
II
i=l
y.
ｾY. ,
ｾ
A Q
n
II
i=l
-yo
ｾp.
ｾ
Then if the total consumer's budget is B he will spend on the good "i"
the yB fraction of B. Then it is possible to set Q. = y.B, i = 1 ... n,
ｾ ｾ ｾ
into the formula (38) and investigate the change of prices in terms of
the utility parameters y., i = 1 ... n.
ｾ
It is possible also to take into account the balance of payment
between the selected sectors. Suppose, for example, that S represent
n
the foreign trade, and one would like to have
n-l
r
i=l
Y.
ｾｮ
n-l
r
i=l
Y.
ｮ ｾ
o
That equation can be written in the form
"-
n-l n-l
"-
Y r a. r a .Y .. = 0 (40)
nn i=l ｾ ｮ i=l ｮ ｾ ｾ ｾ
and should be considered as another constraint to the set (37). Then
ｾ ｮ order to observe the balance of payment type of constraints (40) it
is necessary to resign generally speaking, with some of the utility
constraints Q. = y.B, i = 1 ..• n.
ｾ ｾ
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